Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 59 No. 4 2021
Do Majority‐of‐Minority Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions
Abstract
In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions (RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, I find that a majority‐of‐minority shareholder voting mechanism helps mitigate expropriation. Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions. A difference‐in‐differences analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a significant deterrence effect on RPT volume. I also find that stock markets react positively to the voting rule's passage, and that the rule makes Indian firms more attractive to foreign institutional investors.
- DOI
- 10.1111/1475-679x.12357
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1385-1423
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref