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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 55 No. 2-3 2013

Boardroom centrality and firm performance

David F. Larcker1; Eric C. So2; Charles C. Y. Wang3

1 Stanford University · 2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology · 3 Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, United States

Abstract

Firms with central boards of directors earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns. A long (short) position in the most (least) central firms earns average annual returns of 4.68%. Firms with central boards also experience higher future return-on-assets growth and more positive analyst forecast errors. Return prediction, return-on-assets growth, and analyst errors are concentrated among high growth opportunity firms or firms confronting adverse circumstances, consistent with boardroom connections mattering most for firms standing to benefit most from information and resources exchanged through boardroom networks. Overall, our results suggest that director networks provide economic benefits that are not immediately reflected in stock prices.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.01.006
Volume
55
Issue
2-3
Pages
225-250
Language
en
Sources
crossref openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib

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