Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 53 No. 1-2 2012
SEC enforcement: Does forthright disclosure and cooperation really matter?
Abstract
This study examines the conditions under which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercises enforcement leniency following a restatement. I explore whether cooperation with SEC staff and forthright disclosure of a restatement (e.g., disclosures reported in a timely and visible manner) reduce the likelihood of an SEC sanction or SEC monetary penalties. After controlling for restatement severity, I find that cooperation increases the likelihood of being sanctioned, perhaps because it improves the SEC's ability to build a successful case against the firm. However, cooperation and forthright disclosures are rewarded by the SEC through lower monetary penalties.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.06.006
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 353-374
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref