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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 58 No. 1 2014

Knowledge, compensation, and firm value: An empirical analysis of firm communication

Feng Li1; Michael Minnis2; Venky Nagar1; Madhav V. Rajan3

1 University of Michigan–Ann Arbor · 2 University of Chicago · 3 Stanford University

Abstract

Knowledge is central to managing an organization, but its presence in employees is difficult to measure directly. We hypothesize that external communication patterns reveal the location of knowledge within the management team. Using a large database of firm conference call transcripts, we find that CEOs speak less in settings where they are likely to be relatively less knowledgeable. CEOs who speak more are also paid more, and firms whose CEO pay is not commensurate with CEO speaking have a lower industry-adjusted Tobin׳s Q. Communication thus appears to reveal knowledge.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.06.003
Volume
58
Issue
1
Pages
96-116
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

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