Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 56 No. 1 2013
Does investment efficiency improve after the disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting?
Abstract
We provide more direct evidence on the causal relation between the quality of financial reporting and investment efficiency. We examine the investment behavior of a sample of firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We find that prior to the disclosure, these firms under-invest (over-invest) when they are financially constrained (unconstrained). More importantly, we find that after the disclosure, these firms’ investment efficiency improves significantly.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.03.001
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-18
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref