Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 8 No. 2 1986
Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information
Abstract
In this paper, an informational asymmetry exists between investors and the issuer of an initial public offering about the value of the security. To avoid market failure, a solution is proposed in which the issuer makes a disclosure about firm value that is verified by an investment banker. The investment banker enters into a contingent contract with investors which imposes a penalty if the ex post observable cash flow indicates fraudulent disclosure. A bivariate signalling model is formulated and solved, and testable implications are derived from comparative statics analysis.
- DOI
- 10.1016/0165-4101(86)90014-5
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 119-142
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref