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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 53 No. 3 2012

Evidence on the determinants and economic consequences of delegated monitoring

Anne Beatty1,2; Scott Liao3; Joseph Weber4

1 Fisher College · 2 The Ohio State University · 3 University of Toronto · 4 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

open access

Abstract

We investigate delegated monitoring by examining the determinants and effects of including cross-acceleration provisions in public debt contracts. We find that cross-acceleration provision use depends on borrowers' going concern relative to liquidation values, debt repayment structures, credit quality, and financial reporting quality. This suggests that the use of cross-acceleration provisions increases when the costs of cascading defaults are lower, the conflicts between creditor classes are higher, and the benefits of delegating monitoring to banks are higher. We also find a lower interest rate on public debt contracts with cross-acceleration provisions, but the rate reduction depends on borrowers' financial reporting quality.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.12.002
Volume
53
Issue
3
Pages
555-576
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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