Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 52 No. 2-3 2011
Towards a theory of accounting regulation: A discussion of the politics of disclosure regulation along the economic cycle
Abstract
The paper by Bertomeu and Magee (this issue) endogenizes accounting regulation by a majority-seeking regulator and examines how the economic cycle affects mandatory reporting quality. This discussion puts the paper in the broader context of a theory of accounting regulation. Then, it focuses on crucial assumptions, including the exogenous evolution of the economy, the role of market frictions, the modeling of reporting quality, and the regulatory process and regulatory cycles, and provides suggestions for future research.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.08.006
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 228-234
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref