Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 78 No. 1 2024
Rank-and-file accounting employee compensation and financial reporting quality
Abstract
We use a proprietary database with detailed, employee-specific compensation contract information for rank-and-file corporate accountants who are directly involved in the financial reporting process to assess their influence on their firms' financial reporting quality. Theory predicts that paying above-market wages can both attract employees with more human capital and subsequently encourage better performance. Consistent with audit committees structuring accountants' compensation to mitigate financial misreporting that might otherwise occur, we find that firms with relatively well-paid accountants tend to issue higher-quality financial reports. Moreover, this relationship is more pronounced when firms’ senior executives have stronger contractual incentives to misreport and when the audit committee is more independent from management.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101672
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 101672
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref