Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 80 No. 1 2025
Signaling long-term information using short-term forecasts
Abstract
This paper shows theoretically and empirically that the decision to disclose a short-term earnings forecast can reveal managers’ private information about long-term performance. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that the decision to disclose a short-term earnings forecast predicts long-term performance for up to three years. The relation strengthens when current period performance is poor, when managers have longer horizons, and when competitive threats are lower. Endogenizing the proprietary costs of disclosure, our analysis suggests that––despite the short horizon––the decision to provide an earnings forecast contains significant information about long-term performance and thus can entail proprietary costs.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101768
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 101768
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref