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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 65 No. 2-3 2018

Scope for renegotiation in private debt contracts

Valeri V. Nikolaev

University of Chicago

Abstract

I study whether the demand for monitoring explains the scope for renegotiation in private debt contracts. Theory suggests that renegotiation trades off the benefits of enhanced monitoring with the costs of creditor intervention. Consistent with this tradeoff, I show that monitoring demand proxies bear a positive association with renegotiation intensity. In contrast, the costs of creditor intervention are associated with less frequent renegotiations. I also find that contractual monitoring mechanisms, such as covenants and concentrated syndicate structures, are positively related to renegotiation intensity. Furthermore, renegotiations transmit new information to the market, in line with private creditors discovering information during renegotiations.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.11.007
Volume
65
Issue
2-3
Pages
270-301
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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