Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 67 No. 1 2019
Do women managers keep firms out of trouble? Evidence from corporate litigation and policies
Abstract
We find that firms where women have more power in the top management team, measured by female executives’ plurality and pay slice, face fewer operations-related lawsuits. This effect is robust to several treatments of endogeneity and does not appear to be driven by female executives' greater willingness to settle the cases. Evidence from a simultaneous equations approach suggests that firms where women executives have more power avoid lawsuits partly by avoiding some risky but value-increasing firm policies, such as more aggressive R&D, intensive advertising, and policies inimical to other parties.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.09.004
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 202-225
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib