Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 19 No. 2-3 1995
Communication and delegation in collusive agencies
Abstract
Collusion may benefit an organization if the employees, by sharing effort, information, or risk, can enhance production or lower costs. Collusion is detrimental if it leads to less effort or to withholding of information. A contract that utilizes the agents' cooperative behavior dictates less relative performance evaluation than does a noncooperative contract or a contract that ensures the employees do not cooperate. Delegation of decision authority is beneficial for a broader range of organizations if employees collude than if they do not. The constructed contracts are incentive compatible for coalitions as well as for individuals.
- DOI
- 10.1016/0165-4101(94)00386-j
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 315-344
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref