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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 47 No. 1-2 2009

The impact of the options backdating scandal on shareholders

Gennaro Bernile1; Gregg A. Jarrell2

1 University of Miami · 2 University of Rochester

Abstract

The revelation that scores of firms engaged in the illegal manipulation of stock options’ grant dates (i.e. “backdating”) captured much public attention. The evidence indicates that the consequences stemming from management misconduct and misrepresentation are of first-order importance in this context as shareholders of firms accused of backdating experience large negative, statistically significant abnormal returns. Furthermore, shareholders’ losses are directly related to firms’ likely culpability and the magnitude of the resulting restatements, despite the limited cash flow implications. And, tellingly, the losses are attenuated when tainted management of less successful firms is more likely to be replaced and relatively many firms become takeover targets.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.11.004
Volume
47
Issue
1-2
Pages
2-26
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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