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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 61 No. 1 2016

Labor unemployment insurance and earnings management

Yiwei Dou1; Mozaffar Khan2,3; Youli Zou4

1 New York University · 2 Harvard University · 3 University of Minnesota · 4 George Washington University

Abstract

We provide new evidence that firms appear to manage long-run earnings upward in order to manage rank and file employees’ perceptions of employment security. In particular, we exploit exogenous state-level changes in unemployment insurance benefits and test for partial unwinding of prior upward earnings management when benefits increase. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant reduction in abnormal accruals, increased recognition of special items and write downs, and greater likelihood of net income-reducing restatements, following an increase in state-level unemployment benefits. A number of cross-sectional results are also consistent with the hypothesis.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.06.001
Volume
61
Issue
1
Pages
166-184
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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