Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 54 No. 1 2012
Local investors and corporate governance
Abstract
This paper shows that local institutional investors are effective monitors of corporate behavior. Firms with high local ownership have better internal governance and are more profitable. These firms are also less likely to manage their earnings aggressively or backdate options and are less likely to be targets of class action lawsuits. Further, managers of such firms exhibit a lower propensity to engage in “empire building” and are less likely to “lead the quiet life”. Examining the local monitoring mechanisms, we find that local institutions are more likely to introduce shareholder proposals, increase CEO turnover, and reduce excess CEO pay.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.03.002
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-67
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref