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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 73 No. 1 2022

Rocking the boat: How relative performance evaluation affects corporate risk taking

Truc Do1; Huai Zhang2; Luo Zuo3

1 The University of Queensland · 2 Nanyang Technological University · 3 Cornell University

Abstract

We argue that relative performance evaluation (RPE) contracts introduce a tournament among the focal firm and peer firms. We test whether a firm's riskiness is altered by its CEO's incentive to win the tournament. We find that a firm that performed poorly relative to its peers during an interim period takes more risk in the remainder of the evaluation period than a firm with better interim performance. This effect is stronger when the interim assessment date is closer to the end of the evaluation period and when winning the competition is more important to the CEO. Together, our results suggest that RPE contracts create tournament incentives for CEOs and significantly affect corporate risk taking.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101425
Volume
73
Issue
1
Pages
101425
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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