Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 33 No. 1 2002
Stock options for undiversified executives
Abstract
We employ a certainty-equivalence framework to analyze the cost, value and pay/performance sensitivity of non-tradable options held by undiversified, risk-averse executives. We derive “executive value” lines, the risk-adjusted analogues to Black–Scholes lines. We show that distinguishing between “executive value” and “company cost” provides insight into many issues regarding stock option practice including: executive views about Black–Scholes values; tradeoffs between options, restricted stock and cash; exercise price policies; option repricings; early exercise policies and decisions; and the length of vesting periods. It also leads to reinterpretations of both cross-sectional facts and longitudinal trends in the level of executive compensation.
- DOI
- 10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00050-7
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-42
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref