Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 21 No. 3 1996
Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation
Abstract
We extend the contracting paradigm advanced in Smith and Watts (1992) to consider cross-sectional associations between investment opportunities and the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance measures. We predict stronger associations between compensation and performance for firms with greater investment opportunities. We also predict greater use of market-based, rather than accounting-based, performance indicators as a basis for incentive payments when investment opportunities are substantial components of firm value. Results for specifications of 1992 and 1993 changes in compensation paid to CEOs of 1,249 publicly-traded U.S. firms are consistent with these hypotheses.
- DOI
- 10.1016/0165-4101(96)00421-1
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 297-318
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref