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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 66 No. 1 2018

Equilibrium voluntary disclosures, asset pricing, and information transfers

Ronald A. Dye; John S. Hughes

Northwestern University

Abstract

We study a firm’s manager’s voluntary disclosure decisions and those disclosure decisions’ asset pricing, cost of capital, and information transfer effects in a model where investors trade multiple securities. We: develop new asset pricing formulas when the manager makes no disclosure that impose testable cross-equation restrictions on firms’ market values; develop a wide array of comparative statics; obtain surprising findings about nondisclosure’s effects on investors’ perceptions of uncertainty about firms’ future cash flows; develop simple, interpretable expressions for firms’ cost of capital; and show how no disclosure by one firm generates informational externalities on other firms.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.11.003
Volume
66
Issue
1
Pages
1-24
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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