Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 43 No. 1 2007
Executive compensation and capital structure: The effects of convertible debt and straight debt on CEO pay
Abstract
I examine how CEO compensation is related to firms’ capital structures. My tests address the simultaneity of these decisions and distinguish between debt types with different theoretical implications for managerial incentives. Pay–performance sensitivity decreases in straight-debt leverage, but is higher in firms with convertible debt. Furthermore, stock option policy is the component of CEO pay that is most sensitive to differences in capital structure. The results strongly support the hypothesis that firms trade-off shareholder-manager incentive alignment in order to mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest. The hypothesis that debt reduces manager-shareholder conflicts can explain some but not all of the results.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.09.003
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 69-93
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref