Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 23 No. 2 1997
An experimental investigation of multi-defendant bargaining in ‘joint and several’ and proportionate liability regimes
Abstract
This study uses experimental methods to assess how different legal regimes affect the frequency and amounts of settlements in a three person setting (one plaintiff and two defendants). The four legal regimes investigated differ along two dimensions: (1) allocation of liability, either ‘joint and several’ or proportionate liability, and (2) liability mappings, either unconditional or conditional mappings. We find that the lowest settlement frequencies occur in regimes with joint and several allocation rules. In addition, joint and several rules have the most adverse effects on the defendants' wealth.
- DOI
- 10.1016/s0165-4101(97)00005-0
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 189-221
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref