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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 43 No. 1 2007

Jeopardy, non-public information, and insider trading around SEC 10-K and 10-Q filings

Steven J. Huddart1; Bin Ke1; Charles Shi2

1 Pennsylvania State University · 2 University of California, Irvine

Abstract

Evidence contrasting U.S. insider trades in high- and low-jeopardy periods and across firms at high and low risk for 10b-5 litigation indicates that insiders condition their trades on foreknowledge of price-relevant public disclosures, but avoid profitable trades when the jeopardy associated with such trades is high, such as immediately before earnings announcements. Insiders avoid profitable trades before quarterly earnings are announced and sell (buy) after good (bad) news earnings announcements. Insiders trade most heavily after earnings announcements and profit from foreknowledge of price-relevant information in the forthcoming Form 10-K or 10-Q filing.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.06.003
Volume
43
Issue
1
Pages
3-36
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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