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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 49 No. 1-2 2010

Audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process

Ellen Engel1,2; Rachel M. Hayes3; Xue Wang4,5

1 University of Illinois Chicago · 2 University of Chicago · 3 University of Utah · 4 Emory University · 5 Fisher College

open access

Abstract

We examine the relation between audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process. We find that total compensation and cash retainers paid to audit committees are positively correlated with audit fees and the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, our proxies for the demand for monitoring. Our results are robust to the inclusion of audit committee quality, measured as the committee chair financial expertise. Our results suggest a recent willingness by firms to deviate from the historically prevalent one-size-fits-all approach to director pay in response to increased demands on audit committees and differential director expertise.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.08.001
Volume
49
Issue
1-2
Pages
136-154
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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