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Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 46 No. 1 2008

Institutional stakeholdings and better-informed traders at earnings announcements

Ashiq Ali1; Sandy Klasa2; OLIVER ZHEN LI

1 The University of Texas at Dallas · 2 University of Arizona

Abstract

Utama and Cready [Utama, S., Cready, W.M., 1997. Institutional ownership, differential predisclosure precision and trading volume at announcement dates. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 129–150] use total institutional ownership to proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders, an important determinant of trading around earnings announcements. We argue that institutions holding small stakes cannot justify the fixed cost of developing private predisclosure information. Also, institutions with large stakes generally do not trade around earnings announcements since they are dedicated investors or face regulations that make informed trading difficult. However, institutions holding medium stakes have incentives to develop private predisclosure information and trade on it; we show that their ownership is a finer proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders at earnings announcements.

DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.06.001
Volume
46
Issue
1
Pages
47-61
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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