Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 29 No. 3 2000
Purchase versus pooling in stock-for-stock acquisitions: Why do firms care?
Abstract
We investigate firms’ choices between the purchase and pooling methods in stock-for-stock acquisitions. We find that in acquisitions with large step-ups to targets’ net assets, CEOs with earnings-based compensation are more likely to choose pooling and avoid the earnings ‘penalty’ associated with purchases. We find no association between stock-based compensation and the purchase–pooling choice, suggesting that managers are not concerned about implications of large step-ups for firms’ equity values. We also find that the likelihood of purchase increases with debt contracting costs, consistent with its favorable balance sheet effects, and with costs of qualifying for pooling, particularly the restriction of share repurchases.
- DOI
- 10.1016/s0165-4101(00)00023-9
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 261-286
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref