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Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 84 2017

Do all new brooms sweep clean? Evidence for outside bank appointments

Thomas Kick1,2; Inge Nehring3; Andrea Schertler3

1 Deutsche Bundesbank · 2 Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg · 3 Leuphana University of Lüneburg

Abstract

Banks in bad financial shape are more likely to appoint executive directors from the outside than those in good shape. It is, however, not clear whether all of these appointments necessarily lead to the desired turnaround. We analyze the performance effects of new board members with external boardroom experience (outsiders) by distinguishing between good and bad managerial abilities of executives based on either ROA or risk-return efficiency of their previous employers. Our results show that banks appointing bad outsiders underperform other banks while those appointing good outsiders do so to a lesser extent. The performance differentials are highly pronounced in high-risk banks and in the post-crisis period.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.07.005
Volume
84
Pages
135-151
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

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