Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 96 2018
Disciplinary directors: Evidence from the appointments of outside directors who have fired CEOs
open access
Abstract
By examining board appointments of outside directors who have previously fired a CEO, we study how directors’ willingness to take disciplinary actions is related to a firm's performance and risk-taking. Such directors (‘disciplinary directors’) appear to benefit firms with weak monitoring, but hurt firms in innovative industries. Firms appointing a disciplinary director subsequently exhibit lower idiosyncratic risk, leverage, and R&D expense, make fewer acquisitions, and are more likely to replace poorly performing CEOs. Overall, disciplinary directors appear to influence managerial behavior and shareholder wealth.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.09.012
- Volume
- 96
- Pages
- 221-235
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib