Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 27 No. 8 2003
Corporate use of interest rate swaps: Theory and evidence
Abstract
We develop a simply theory on interest rate swaps based on the difference between bank loans and public debts. While restrictive covenants of bank loans help reduce agency costs, banks also have natural disadvantages in bearing interest rate risk due to their floating liabilities. A firm that wants a fixed-rate loan can borrow a floating-rate loan from a bank and enter an interest rate swap to hedge the interest rate risk. Consistent with our theory, we find empirically that fixed-rate swap payers generally have lower credit ratings, higher leverage ratios, higher percentages of long-term floating-rate loans, and are more likely to use bank loans than floating-rate swap payers.
- DOI
- 10.1016/s0378-4266(02)00275-3
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1511-1538
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib