Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 37 No. 9 2013
Investment horizon, risk, and compensation in the banking industry
Abstract
This paper examines the relation between the investment horizon of banks and their CEO compensation, and its consequences for risk and performance. We find that banks with short-term investment intensity pay more cash bonus, exhibit higher risk and perform more poorly than banks with longer-term investment intensity. This evidence is broadly consistent with the view that short-term means of compensation encouraged a short-term investment focus, which in turn led to both higher risk and resulted in poorer performance, culminating in the sub-prime crisis. The inverse risk-performance relation suggests pay schemes were incongruent with shareholders’ interest. Moreover, pay arrangements used in banks prior to the subprime crisis exposed banks to the ex-post settling up problem (the clawback problem).
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.05.021
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 3669-3680
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib