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Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 143 2022

Trust and monitoring

Simon Lesmeister1; Peter Limbach2; Marc Goergen3

1 University of Cologne · 2 Bielefeld University · 3 IE University

open access

Abstract

We show that in countries with more societal trust shareholders cast fewer votes at shareholder meetings and are more supportive of management proposals. This result is confirmed by instrumental variable regressions. It also holds at the U.S.-county level and for voting by U.S. institutional investors. Lower monitoring via voting relates less negatively to future firm performance in high-trust countries, suggesting that managers do not exploit greater discretion when trust is high. We also find a negative relation between trust and bond spreads. Our evidence supports theory arguing that trust substitutes for monitoring and has implications for investors’ optimal monitoring effort.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106587
Volume
143
Pages
106587
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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