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Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 36 No. 4 2012

Closing and cloning in open-end mutual funds

Hsiu-Lang Chen1; Sheldon Gao2; Xiaoqing Hu1

1 University of Illinois Chicago · 2 China Universal Asset Management (HK), 27/F, One IFC, 1 Harbor View Street, Central, Hong Kong

open access

Abstract

Using a unique dataset, we document that only those closed funds for which no new fund is subsequently launched continuously deliver positive abnormal returns. This suggests the existence of an optimal fund scale. In spite of the potential diseconomies of scale, a non-trivial proportion of closed funds have new funds cloned—the scale motive would not be a complete explanation for the closure. When managers of closed funds clone new funds, they receive greater public attention and thus can attract more fund flows and charge higher fees. Furthermore, better-performing closed fund managers attract more fund flows to their new siblings, making the closure an effective mechanism to extract economic rents. Overall, we find that closing and cloning is an attractive strategy for funds seeking to increase their management fees and funds with more managers in place. Aspects of the closed fund family also affect the launch decision of new siblings.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.11.010
Volume
36
Issue
4
Pages
1210-1223
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

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