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Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 48 2014

Corporate governance and the dynamics of capital structure: New evidence

Ya-Kai Chang; Robin K. Chou; Tai-Hsin Huang

National Chengchi University

Abstract

The effects of corporate governance on optimal capital structure choices have been well documented, though without offering empirical evidence about the impact of corporate governance quality on the adjustment speed toward an optimal capital structure. This study simultaneously considers two effects of debt originating from agency theory—the takeover defense and the disciplinary effects of debt—on the speed of adjustment to the optimal capital structure. Corporate governance has a distinct effect on the speed of capital structure adjustment: weak governance firms that are underlevered tend to adjust slowly to the optimal capital structure, because the costs of the disciplinary role of debt outweigh the benefits of using debt as a takeover defense tool. Although overlevered weak governance firms also adjust slowly, they do so because they are reluctant to decrease their leverage toward the target level to deter potential raiders, especially if they face a serious takeover threat. Therefore, this study finds that both overlevered and underlevered firms with weak governance adjust slowly toward their target debt levels, though with different motivations.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.026
Volume
48
Pages
374-385
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

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