← Search

Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 32 No. 12 2008

Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: Evidence from China

Hong Zou1,2; Sonia M. L. Wong3; Clement Shum3; Jun Xiong; Jun Yan4

1 City University of Hong Kong · 2 University of Hong Kong · 3 Lingnan University · 4 Ping An (China)

open access

Abstract

This paper examines the demand for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) by Chinese listed companies where controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts are acute due to the concentrated and split ownership structure. We hypothesize and find evidence that the incidence of seeking D&O insurance is positively related to the extent of controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts – a finding not previously documented in the literature. Using an event study, we find that the announcements of D&O insurance decisions in firms that engage in earnings management, and/or are controlled by a local government (such firms tend to have stronger incentives to tunnel), seem to have a negative wealth effect. In addition, the incidence of the D&O insurance decision is positively related to the proportion of independent directors and several litigation risk proxies. Therefore, the breakthrough in corporate governance and judicial reforms has created non-negligible perceived securities litigation risks in China.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.05.015
Volume
32
Issue
12
Pages
2636-2645
Language
en
Sources
openalex openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

Cite