Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 114 2020
Can reputation concern restrain bad news hoarding in family firms?
Abstract
Family involvement as chair of the board combines the reputation of the controlling family and the firm. Thus, the family's incentive to prevent reputation loss acts as a corporate governance mechanism in mitigating self-serving and bad news hoarding behavior of family firms. We find a lower future stock price crash risk in family firms with family related chairman, compared with family firms with non-family related chairman. The impact of family related chairman is more pronounced in firms with weaker external monitoring and more severe financial distress, and when families have greater reputation concern. Additionally, we find family-chair firms conduct more bad news forecasting, less tunneling behavior, higher earnings quality, as well as have lower costs of equity and overall better performance in the future. The family CEO has little impact on future stock price crash risk.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105808
- Volume
- 114
- Pages
- 105808
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib