Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 42 2014
Firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt
Abstract
We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on firm cash holdings and the value of cash. We document a positive relation between CEO inside debt and firm cash holdings. This positive effect is magnified by firm leverage and mitigated by the presence of financial constraints. We further find that the marginal value of cash to shareholders declines as CEO inside debt increases. Our evidence supports the view that inside debt tilts managerial incentives toward bondholders and helps balance the competing interests of stockholders and bondholders. The evidence also suggests, however, that inside debt can harm shareholder value by encouraging excess cash holdings.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.01.031
- Volume
- 42
- Pages
- 83-100
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib