Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 27 No. 7 2003

Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany

Julie Ann Elston¹; Lawrence G. Goldberg²

¹ University of Central Florida · ² University of Miami

Abstract

With the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation.

DOI

10.1016/s0378-4266(02)00274-1

Volume

27

Issue

7

Pages

1391-1410

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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