Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 161 2024
US political corruption and quarterly conference calls
Abstract
We find that managers obfuscate during conference calls when their firm's headquarters is in a politically corrupt state, and they do so to shield assets from corrupt officials. The positive association between corruption and obfuscation by managers is much stronger when the expropriation risks are higher, such as when the firm (a) does not pay dividends, (b) is making a profit, (c) has more cash, (d) has fewer subsidiaries, and (e) is not making any political contributions. We do not find evidence that managers obfuscate during conference calls to hide their self-dealing.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107108
- Volume
- 161
- Pages
- 107108
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib