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Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 35 No. 4 2011

Information verifiability, bank organization, bank competition and bank–borrower relationships

Masaji Kano1; Hirofumi Uchida2; Gregory F. Udell3; Wako Watanabe4

1 Gifu Shotoku Gakuen University · 2 Kobe University · 3 Indiana University Bloomington · 4 Keio University

open access

Abstract

This paper investigates whether the benefits of bank–borrower relationships differ depending on three factors identified in the theoretical literature: verifiability of information, bank size and complexity, and bank competition. We extend the current literature by analyzing how relationship lending affects loan contract terms and credit availability in an empirical model that simultaneously accounts for all three of these factors. Based on Japanese survey data we find evidence that the benefits from stronger bank–borrower relationships in terms of credit availability are limited to smaller banks. However, when the benefits are measured as improved credit terms, we find little additional benefit, and in some cases increased cost, from stronger relationships for opaque borrowers and for borrowers who get funding from small banks. These latter findings suggest the possibility that relationship borrowers may suffer from capture effects.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.09.010
Volume
35
Issue
4
Pages
935-954
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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