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Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 71 2016

Limited deposit insurance coverage and bank competition

Oz Shy1; Rune Stenbacka2; Vladimir Yankov3,4

1 MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA · 2 Hanken School of Economics · 3 Federal Reserve · 4 Federal Reserve Board of Governors

Abstract

Deposit insurance designs in many countries place a limit on the coverage of deposits in each bank. However, no limits are placed on the number of accounts held with different banks. Therefore, under limited deposit insurance, some consumers open accounts with different banks to achieve higher or full deposit insurance coverage. We compare three regimes of deposit insurance: no deposit insurance, unlimited deposit insurance, and limited deposit insurance. We show that limited deposit insurance weakens competition among banks and reduces total welfare relative to no or unlimited deposit insurance.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.05.002
Volume
71
Pages
95-108
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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