← Search

Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 99 2019

Politicians’ promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China

Li Wang1; Lukas Menkhoff2,3; Michael Schröder2; Xian Xu4

1 East China Normal University · 2 Centre for European Economic Research · 3 German Institute for Economic Research · 4 Fudan University

Abstract

This paper shows that politicians’ pressure to climb the career ladder increases bank risk exposure in their region. Chinese local politicians are set growth targets in their region that are relative to each other. Growth is stimulated by debt-financed programs which are mainly financed via bank loans. The stronger the performance pressure the riskier the respective local bank exposure becomes. This effect holds for local banks which are under some control of local politicians, it has increased with the release of stimulus packages requiring local co-financing and it is stronger if politicians hold chairmen positions in bank boards.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.11.013
Volume
99
Pages
63-94
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite