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Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 88 2018

Do players perform for pay? An empirical examination via NFL players’ compensation contracts

Seoyoung Kim1; Atulya Sarin1; Saagar Sarin2,3

1 Santa Clara University · 2 University of Southern California · 3 California Southern University

Abstract

How to properly compensate and incentivize players is an important question in the realm of professional sports, and more broadly, is a central question in contract design. With the increasing use of performance-based compensation packages and tax law favoring such compensation design, a natural question arises as to whether workers do indeed perform for pay. We examine this question in a setting that is not fraught with the typical measurement and identification problems found in many pay-performance settings. Specifically, we examine changes in a NFL player's Win Probability Added (WPA) and Expected Points Added (EPA) in response to his compensation-contract design. Overall, our paper provides evidence that players do indeed perform for (properly designed) pay, and has important implications for future work on compensation and incentive-based contract design.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.01.004
Volume
88
Pages
330-346
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

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