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Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 37 No. 11 2013

The regulator’s trade-off: Bank supervision vs. minimum capital

Florian Buck1; Eva Schliephake2

1 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München · 2 Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg

Abstract

We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and the supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, whereas strict supervision reduces the scope of intermediation and is costly for taxpayers. We show that a mix of both instruments minimises the costs of preventing the collapse of financial intermediation. Once we allow for cross-border banking, the optimal policy is not feasible. If domestic supervisory effort is not observable, our model predicts a race to the bottom in capital requirement regulation. Therefore, countries are better off by harmonising regulation on an international standard.

DOI
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.012
Volume
37
Issue
11
Pages
4584-4598
Language
en
Sources
crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex

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