Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 37 No. 11 2013
The regulator’s trade-off: Bank supervision vs. minimum capital
Abstract
We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and the supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, whereas strict supervision reduces the scope of intermediation and is costly for taxpayers. We show that a mix of both instruments minimises the costs of preventing the collapse of financial intermediation. Once we allow for cross-border banking, the optimal policy is not feasible. If domestic supervisory effort is not observable, our model predicts a race to the bottom in capital requirement regulation. Therefore, countries are better off by harmonising regulation on an international standard.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.012
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 4584-4598
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex