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Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 62 2020

The anatomy of block accumulations by activist shareholders

Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal; Jan Schnitzler1,2

1 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam · 2 Tinbergen Institute

Abstract

We conduct a large-sample analysis of investor activism in the US based on all 13D filings from 2001 to 2016. While hedge funds represent the largest filer group, the sample contains a diverse set of other activist shareholders. This raises the question to what extent other investors perform a governance role similar to hedge funds. Based on target firms' outcome variables, like announcement returns of activist campaigns and changes in operating performance measures, we find surprisingly few differences. However, hedge funds play a special role when it comes towards takeovers. They stimulate monitoring activities among relatively larger firms and they help to set payout policies.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101620
Volume
62
Pages
101620
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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