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Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 16 No. 4 2010

Pay-performance sensitivity and firm size: Insights from the mutual fund industry

George D. Cashman

Texas Tech University

Abstract

I examine the ex ante decision to make an agent's pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of organization size. I focus on mutual funds and their decision to use compensation contracts that reduce the advisor's marginal compensation as the fund grows (a declining-rate contract) over the dominant contract type, where marginal compensation is unrelated to fund size (a single-rate contract). I find evidence consistent with the view that declining-rate contracts are a mechanism to keep marginal compensation in line with the advisor's declining marginal product. Specifically, I find that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to use a declining-rate contract and to specify a greater amount of compensation decline in their contracts. Consistent with optimal contracting, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with declining-rate contracts and funds with single-rate contracts.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.04.003
Volume
16
Issue
4
Pages
400-412
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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