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Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 29 2014

Value impact of debt issuances by targets of withdrawn takeovers

Tomas Jandik1; Justin Lallemand2

1 University of Arkansas at Fayetteville · 2 University of Denver

Abstract

An existing finance theory predicts that managers of takeover targets will increase leverage to enhance managerial control which can, in turn, allow target managers to thwart a takeover attempt altogether. We find that targets significantly increase leverage, not only by issuing more debt, but also by repurchasing more equity. We also find that debt issuances by poorly performing target managers made between takeover announcement and withdrawal result in significantly negative abnormal returns at the time of the issuance, consistent with the entrenchment role of debt. On the other hand, debt issued by high-performing target managers is not found to result in these same negative returns. Additionally, we document that debt-increasing, poorly performing targets experience significantly more negative returns at withdrawal announcement, also followed by significantly negative post-withdrawal stock performance, while these negative effects are offset for high-performing targets. Overall, our findings suggest that managerial motivations to block takeover attempts with increased debt issuance differ and that these differences in motivation are recognized by the market.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.002
Volume
29
Pages
475-494
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

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