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Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 68 2021

Does the market understand the ex ante risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders?

Yan-Leung Cheung1; P. Raghavendra Rau2; Aris Stouraitis3; Weiqiang Tan1

1 Education University of Hong Kong · 2 Cambridge Judge Business School, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1AG, United Kingdom · 3 Hong Kong Baptist University

Abstract

We examine how the market values operating assets in the presence of time-varying ex ante risk that these assets may be tunneled away. We analyze pairs of Chinese publicly listed firms and their non-listed parents and examine the market valuation of current assets (cash balances, trade receivables, receivables due from the controlling shareholders, inventories) and fixed assets on the publicly listed firm's balance sheet. Our results show that in periods when the risk of tunneling from the publicly listed firm to its controlling shareholder increases, operating assets that are easy to tunnel (cash and receivables due from the controlling shareholder) are valued at larger discounts, while operating assets that are not easy to tunnel (trade receivables, inventories, fixed assets) are not valued at such discounts.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101946
Volume
68
Pages
101946
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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