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Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 50 2018

Executive compensation and corporate financing policies: Evidence from CEO inside debt

Steven Freund; Saira Latif; Hieu V. Phan

University of Massachusetts Lowell

Abstract

We examine the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and the firm's choice between debt and equity financing when it accesses external capital markets. We find positive relations between CEO inside debt holdings and both the firm's likelihood to issue debt and the proportion of debt of their total external financing. Additional analysis indicates that CEO inside debt is negatively related to the cost of debt and positively related to the stock price reaction around the public debt issue announcement. Our results are consistent with the argument that inside debt aligns managers' and debtholders' interests leading to favorable debt terms that motivate firms to raise debt to meet their capital needs.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.002
Volume
50
Pages
484-504
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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