Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 11 No. 4 2005
Outside director compensation policy and the investment opportunity set
Abstract
We investigate the relation between outside director compensation and the investment opportunities of firms. The sample of cases is drawn from the period 1996 to 2001. We find that elements of outside director compensation are significantly related to the investment opportunity set. Firms with more investment opportunities pay a higher level of compensation to their outside directors than firms with fewer investment opportunities. In addition to paying more total compensation, firms with greater investment opportunities compensate directors more heavily with stock-based forms of compensation than with cash. The result is consistent with the hypothesis that board compensation policy is designed to: (1) attract directors whose marginal productivity interacts with the investment opportunities of the firm to produce the maximal gain, and (2) mitigate agency problems. We also document a positive relation between total compensation of outside directors and firm size. A separate analysis indicates the results are economically significant. We conclude that firms pay more and emphasize incentive-based compensation to motivate outside directors to act in the interests of shareholders when the costs of monitoring are high.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2004.11.002
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 680-715
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref