Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 86 2024
Independence of board leadership of acquirers and the success of mergers and acquisitions
Abstract
Effective board monitoring prevents entrenched managers from undertaking acquisitions that are detrimental to shareholders. It also facilitates a smooth transition during the post-acquisition phase. We examine how independent board leadership affects M&A outcomes. Controlling for many firm, board, and CEO attributes, we find that acquirers with independent board chairpersons earn significantly higher CAR around M&A announcements. The positive effects of independent board chairpersons are more pronounced in acquirers with high monitoring needs. The boards led by independent chairpersons primarily add value by selecting targets with high synergetic gains, avoiding overpaying for targets, and facilitating smooth transition in the post-acquisition phase.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102581
- Volume
- 86
- Pages
- 102581
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib